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The Effects of MiFID II on Sell-Side Analysts, Buy-Side Analysts, and Firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides early but broad empirical evidence on a major new investor protection 
regulation in Europe, MiFID II, which requires investment firms to unbundle investment 
research from other costs they charge to clients. We predict that the price separation resulting 
from unbundling and a hard-dollar system leads to a shrinking of the market for sell-side 
investment research, manifested in lower quantity of sell-side coverage that is of higher quality 
than before the regulation. We test our predictions in difference-in-differences matched-sample 
research designs with firm fixed effects. We find a decrease in the number of sell-side analysts 
covering European firms after MiFID II implementation, particularly for firms that are less 
important to the sell-side. However, research quality improves; specifically, individual analyst 
forecasts are more accurate and stock recommendations garner greater market reactions. In 
addition, sell-side analysts seem to cater more to the buy-side after MiFID II by providing 
industry recommendations along with stock recommendations. Importantly, we predict and find 
evidence that buy-side investment firms turn to more in-house research after MiFID II 
implementation. Equally interesting, buy-side analysts increase their participation and 
engagement in earnings conference calls compared to the control group. Finally, we find some 
evidence that stock-market liquidity decreases post-MiFID II. Our findings have implications 
beyond Europe, as investors are currently pressuring the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to adopt a similar regulation. 
 




The Effects of MiFID II on Sell-Side Analysts, Buy-Side Analysts, and Firms 
1. Introduction 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) is a financial services directive 
that became effective in the European Union (EU) on January 3, 2018.1 MiFID II applies to the 31 
countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), which comprises the 28 EU members plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway. One of the important changes set forth by MiFID II is the requirement 
for asset managers and broker-dealers to unbundle the cost of investment research and advisory 
services from the cost of trade execution. In other words, the information presented to the client must 
separately and transparently show all the different costs and charges, including any third-party 
payments, as well as justify how external research contributes to better investment decisions so that it 
is not considered an inducement (PwC 2016).  
In this study, we provide early but broad empirical evidence on the effects of this 
sweeping new regulation on sell-side analyst research and buy-side research. The requirements to 
unbundle research costs and justify the usefulness of external research create a unique opportunity to 
empirically examine a mechanism that, on one hand, addresses trading incentives as a conflict of 
interest affecting analyst behavior, and on the other hand, may transform sell-side research into a 
profit center and thus create new incentives for financial analysts. In additional analyses, we also 
examine the net effect on firm stock-market liquidity. 
MiFID II represents a shake-up of traditional business practices whereby brokers bundle 
2 Soft 
 
1 A directive is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. Each individual member country 
devises its own laws on how to reach these goals (https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en). We use 
Europe, EU, and EEA interchangeably throughout the paper. 
2 Of interest to researchers is also the fact that analyst forecast data in IBES Detail have changed due to MiFID II. 
Thomson Reuters, the owner of IBES, issued a Product Change Notification on September 12, 2018, announcing that the 
contributor and analyst names of 88 pre-approval contributors will be anonymized for all clients, regardless of individual 
entitlements. In addition, estimates from UBS Equities will be removed from the IBES Detail History file and they 
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dollars are a way of paying brokerage firms for their research services indirectly through commission 
revenues rather than through hard dollars. Instead of paying the service providers with cash (i.e., hard 
dollars), the asset manager pays by passing on business to the brokerage firm (i.e., soft dollars). 
Historically, the soft-dollar system emerged to shield broker-dealers from the requirement to register 
as investment advisers upon receiving payment for advice, a status that comes with additional 
regulatory oversight and positive fiduciary duty toward clients (Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and 
Wiener 2009). Disclosure of bundled soft-dollar commissions is more opaque than expensing the 
cost of non-execution services (Erzurumlu and Kotomin 2016). Some argue that the lack of 
transparency of soft-dollar commissions can exacerbate agency conflicts and result in less efficient 
fund operations (Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec 2012).  
We develop predictions on sell-side and buy-side consequences of MiFID II and test them, 
along with firm consequences, in difference-in-differences research designs (using North American 
firms as control firms), with firm and year fixed effects, as well as in propensity-score matched 
samples. 
First, given the public good nature of investment research (Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012) and 
the MiFID II requirement to justify its usefulness if purchased externally, asset management firms 
are likely to reduce their demand for sell-side research. Asset managers may also absorb research 
costs because their clients do not want to pay for equity research given its public good feature (CFA 
Institute 2017). Therefore, we predict that MiFID II will lead to a shrinking of the market for sell-
side investment research, and thus to a reduction in sell-side coverage. Furthermore, because the 
overall resources available for the sell-side are lower after the implementation of MiFID II, we 
expect analysts to reduce the coverage for less important firms to maximize the relative benefits of 
 
explicitly tie this decision with MiFID II implementation (see https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ubs-research-memo/ubs-
suspends-access-to-research-data-for-some-external-providers-idUKKBN1HG2O3). The IBES Summary History file 
does not change, and consensus estimates will continue to include all pre-approval brokers (as well as UBS Equities). 
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their effort. In univariate and multivariate analyses, on the full and matched samples, we find a 
decrease in sell-side coverage and an increase in the probability of completely losing coverage post-
MiFID II for European firms (treatment group) compared to North American firms (control group). 
Firms that are less important to the sell-side, such as firms that are smaller, have lower institutional 
ownership, and do not use external financing, and to a lesser extent, firms with lower trading volume 
appear to suffer more from (complete) losses of sell-side coverage. 
Second, the shrinking demand and price pressure exercised by the buy-side may transform 
sell-side research from a cost center into a profit center. If so, the ability to sell research and the 
capacity to keep costs down become essential. We expect that in this new world, the sell-side uses 
research quality as a product-differentiation mechanism to relax price competition and attract buy-
side business. We test this prediction in analyst-balanced samples, thereby capturing the change in 
incentives brought by MiFID II. We find higher individual-level earnings forecast accuracy post-
MiFID II in Europe compared to the U.S. and Canada. We further test the unconditional 
informativeness of stock recommendations. Our results suggest that stock ratings for European firms 
are incrementally more informative after the implementation of MiFID II. We also show that stock 
recommendations are more likely to be accompanied by industry recommendations, suggesting that 
sell-side analysts cater more to the buy-side post-MiFID II. 
Next, if investment firms are now required to charge clients for third-party research or pay for 
pense in their profit or loss), a natural reaction would be to 
increase internal investment research efforts so as to minimize purchasing research from the third 
party. Therefore, we expect that investment firms increase in-house research efforts following MiFID 
II implementation. Given this prediction and the fact that buy-side data are hard to obtain, it is 
especially interesting to investigate the response from the buy-side. To gain insight into the buy-side 
response, we follow a unique approach. Specifically, we obtain data on individuals employed as buy-
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side security analysts or associate analysts from Thomson Reuters and sum up the number of 
individuals employed by each buy-side firm. We find strong evidence that the number of buy-side 
analysts increases following MiFID II, suggesting that European investment firms turn to more in-
house research after the implementation of the new regulation. We further explore a setting in which 
the activities of buy-side analysts can be observed directly: corporate conference calls. We identify 
buy-side analysts using conference-call transcripts from FactSet and measure the extent to which 
they interact with management during the calls. We find that buy-side analysts are more likely to 
participate in conference calls and have more interactions with management for European firms after 
MiFID II, relative to North American firms. The evidence further corroborates the finding that 
investment firms turn to more in-house research in the post-MiFID II world. 
Finally, we examine firm stock-market liquidity in the new context created by lower quantity 
but higher quality sell-side research, and more private buy-side research. We find a decrease in stock 
liquidity for European firms in the period that follows MiFID II, relative to the control group, and 
after controlling for corporate disclosure activities and analyst coverage. Given the possibility of 
confounding factors, we avoid drawing strong conclusions from this test. 
Our research makes several contributions. First, we contribute by studying unbundling as a 
mechanism to address conflicts of interest in the sell-side industry. Specifically, our results speak to 
the literature on trading incentives as a conflict of interest affecting sell-  
which is a different type of conflict of interest compared to those generated by employment at 
investment banks that have attracted significant interest in academic research following the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rule 2711 and the Global Settlement (GS).3 Research on 
 
3 For example, the following studies examine the impact of these regulations: Barniv, Hope, Myring, and Thomas (2009); 
Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009); Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011); Guan, Lu, and Wong (2012); 
Corwin, Larocque, and Stegemoller (2017); Hovakimian and Saenyasiri (2010; 2014). As the relationship with 
-
side independence within investment banks. In comparison, MiFID II aims to address a different type of conflicts of 
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trading incentives finds that analysts employed at brokerage firms that earn revenues through trading 
are more optimistic than analysts employed at firms that fund research through both trading and 
underwriting business (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006) and in relation to stocks held by mutual 
fund clients (Firth, Lin, Liu, and Xuan 2013). Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) find that analysts 
working for brokerage firms are on average less accurate and more optimistic compared to analysts 
working for investment banks, and the higher-quality personnel only partly explains this gap. Our 
study contributes by providing evidence on the effects of unbundling when used as a mechanism to 
address the conflict of interest arising from trading incentives. Specifically, we show that unbundling 
leads to lower quantity but higher quality of sell-side research. 
Second, this paper adds to the extant sell-side analyst literature by examining the effects of a 
new regulation that de facto reduces the supply of analyst research. A large literature focuses on the 
role sell-side analysts play for the information environment and uses brokerage-house mergers and 
closures as a quasi-natural experiment (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk 2010; Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012; 
Derrien and Kecskes 2013; Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli 2017). In this literature, the decrease in 
analyst coverage is a plausibly exogenous event while the demand for sell-side research remains, or 
is assumed to remain, constant. Fewer sell-side analysts supplying research for a firm or an industry 
leads to lower competition among analysts, which in turn results in lower quality work, implying that 
a larger sell-side analyst presence benefits the functioning of capital markets. In contrast, the 
decrease in analyst coverage due to MiFID II is not exogenous but accompanied by lower demand 
for sell-side research. Our study shows that unbundling, which leads to lower demand for, and the 
transformation of sell-side equity research into a profit center (i.e., the need to sell research directly 
to the buy-side), creates incentives for the sell-side to produce higher quality research. 
 
interest (i.e., sell-side research used as an inducement to attract buy-side trade execution business), through a different 
mechanism (i.e., unbundling). 
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Third, and importantly, relative to the large sell-side literature, there is limited evidence on 
the buy-side. The research that buy-
decisions (Cheng, Liu, and Qian 2006; Rebello and Wei 2014) and trades induced by the buy-side 
recommendations have higher returns than trades triggered by sell-side recommendations (Frey and 
Herbst 2014). We propose and implement new ways of gauging buy-side research activities, 
specifically by observing the number of buy-side analysts in contact lists compiled by Thomson 
Reuters. 
Fourth, we add to the literature on the dynamics between buy-side institutions and sell-side 
brokerages. Liu (2011) and Gu, Li, and Yang (2013) provide evidence that decisions taken by sell-
side analysts are driven by buy-side demand. We contribute by showing that, at least in part, sell-side 
coverage decisions are motivated by institutional ownership presence, and that a reduction of buy-
side demand for sell-side research leads to sell-side catering more to the buy-side by providing 
industry ratings along with stock ratings and, in general, lower research quantity of higher quality. 
Finally, this study contributes to practice by providing early evidence on a sweeping new 
regulation, and the unbundling requirement, that is starting to affect firms and investors around the 
world. Two concurrent studies examine the effects of MiFID II on the sell-side industry (Guo and 
Mota 2019; Lang, Pinto, and Sul 2019). Our findings on the decrease in sell-side coverage 
accompanied by an increase in quality post-MiFID II converge with these two papers. The unique 
contribution of our study is that we also investigate the research activities conducted by the buy-side 
thereby depicting a more complete picture of the dynamics in the financial services industry upon 
implementation of the unbundling requirement. Our broad empirical evidence should be of interest to 





2. Institutional Setting and Empirical Predictions 
2.1 Further Background on MiFID II 
Under MiFID II, asset management firms can either pass the cost of research on to clients via 
pre-agreed research-payment accounts (i.e., budgets) or absorb the cost of research themselves 
4 Sell-side firms need to provide buy-side investment firms (i.e., 
asset managers) the unbundled costs of trading by separately identifying and charging for execution, 
research, and other advisory services. Buy-side firms have to make explicit payments for external 
research and demonstrate that the research contributes to better investment decisions so that it is not 
considered an inducement (PwC 2016). This means that asset managers and sell-side brokers must 
put a price on research, which implies renegotiating the contracts between the two sides, which in 
turn allows the buy-side to exert price pressure on the sell-side.5 
MiFID II  contrasts with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) model of soft dollars. Under current U.S. rules, brokers who get paid with hard 
dollars must register as investment advisers, an onerous status that involves increased compliance 
and oversight. To appease this conflict, on October 26, 2017, the SEC issued three letters giving U.S. 
investment firms 30 months to abide by MiFID II without violating U.S. regulations.6 Over the long 
term,  opens the way for MiFID II to become a global standard as pressure for 
transparent or lower costs is mounting from investors (Holt 2019; Riding 2019a).7  
 
4 The relevant articles are 23, 24(4)(c), and 24(7)(b). The new regulations apply directly to financial-market players that 
are based in any of the EEA member states as well as to a European branch location of any company headquartered 
outside of the EEA. 
5 While asset managers and stockbrokers usually rely on long-term contracts that specify the overall payment and 
negotiate commissions infrequently (Goldstein et al. 2009), the separate pricing of research required by MiFID II imposes 
such a negotiation. Anecdotal evidence from Cenkos Securities Plc shows a 7% decrease in research commissions in 
-
Securities/reports-and-presentations/2018/Cenkos%20Financial%20Report%202018.pdf, page 1). The lack of 
disaggregated disclosure of research and trading incomes precludes a systematic comparison. 
6 https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2017/sifma-102617-202a.htm, last accessed November 27, 2019. 
7 Large asset managers such as Capital Group ($1.87 trillion) have declared they will absorb the cost of third-party 
investment research across their global business (Riding 2019a). This comes as U.S. clients, having noticed a drop in 
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MiFID II has polarized practitioners. For instance, Erste Bank CEO Andreas Treichl said that 
8 
we may  see a return to deeper, fundamental research and a focus on longer-
term, industry- (IR Magazine 2018 citing Nicky Stewart, director of institutional 
marketing at Edison). 
The unbundling requirement, that is, the switch from the soft-dollar model where the cost of 
research was obfuscated by bundling, to the hard-dollar model where the cost of research must be 
transparent, creates a novel setting where the dynamics between the buy-side and sell-side can be 
observed.9 
 
2.2 Effects on Sell-Side Analysts, Buy-Side Analysts, and Firms 
2.2.1 Sell-Side Research Quantity 
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012, p. 
is a public goods problem: because research is hard to keep private, clients are reluctant to pay for it, 
revenue from bundled services, which would not be viable under MiFID II. Thus, the public good 
 
European transaction fees and commissions, are becoming concerned that they subsidize European clients (Riding 
2019a). As a result, the Council of Institutional Investors has been lobbying the SEC to adopt regulations similar to 
MiFID II in the U.S. (Riding 2019b).  
8  https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/11/03/mfid-ii-treats-both-banks-and-clients-like-kids-erste-bank-ceo.html, last 
accessed April 4, 2019. 
9 The MiFID II requirements to unbundle research costs and justify the usefulness of research address a different type of 
ed the 
conflict of interest generated by funding equity research with investment banking revenue. Previously, sell-side analysts 
in investment banks were incentivized to cater to the investment banking business of their employer through overly 
optimistic stock recommendations since their compensation was related to, and determined by, their ability to attract 
investment banking business (e.g., Guan et al. 2012). After these regulations, the investment banking and research 
departments became physically and financially separated. To a large extent, these regulations applied internationally: the 
GS had spillover effects internationally as the twelve banks involved adopted the same separation across all their 
subsidiaries (Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 2014), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
issued guidelines and best practices in the spirit of NASD Rule 2711, and the EU Market Abuse Directive contained 




feature of research would decrease the resources devoted to the sell-side industry.  
We build on research from the industrial organization literature to predict the effects of 
MiFID II on the scope of sell-side research. Focusing on the economics of information goods 
characterized by high fixed costs and low incremental cost structure, Varian (1995) shows that 
pay. This intuition is in line with prior industrial organization literature that argues that bundling 
products together and charging one price is used to extract consumer surplus (MacAfee, McMillan, 
and Whinston 1989; Stigler 1968). Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001) provide empirical evidence 
consistent with  argument and show that institutional traders pay more for soft-dollar 
execution than for an equivalent execution-only broker. They argue that the incremental amount is 
unlikely to be entirely offset by the research provided by the soft-dollar broker. Following this 
literature, we expect buy-side firms to search for efficiencies in resource allocation under the new 
unbundling regime, thereby lowering the demand for sell-side research. 
Following the intuition discussed above, lack of transparency on the price charged, allows 
buy-side firms to extract rents from investors (i.e., their clients). Assuming investor rationality, price 
transparency leads investors to select the lowest priced option among equivalent substitutes (e.g., 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Maxwell 1995) thereby potentially taking their investments elsewhere or 
renegotiating management fees. To avoid this situation, asset managers can decide to incur the 
research cost themselves as an expense item that impacts the bottom line. As such, sell-side research 
becomes an expense to minimize in order to maximize profits. Therefore, asset managers have an 
additional incentive to purchase research more judiciously, which may reduce the demand for sell-
side research.  
Another mechanism imposed by MiFID II on asset managers is the requirement to 
demonstrate that sell-side research contributes to better investment decisions so that it is not 
10 
 
considered an inducement (PwC 2016). In other words, whenever asset managers use sell-side 
being a source of conflict of interest. However, no such requirement applies to investment research 
generated internally by the buy-side. Because asset managers may not want to disclose to clients that 
they buy a public good, or may have a hard time justifying the usefulness of the purchase, we expect 
that they will increase their internal investment research efforts, at least to some extent, and as a 
result, decrease the demand for sell-side research. 
The effect of MiFID II on sell-side coverage is likely to vary across firms. Analysts are 
economic agents with limited time and resources. Accordingly, they have incentives to allocate more 
(Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 2006; Harford, Jiang, Wang, and Xie 2019). To the extent that the 
overall resources available for the sell-side are lower after the implementation of MiFID II, we 
expect analysts to reduce the coverage for less important firms to maximize the relative benefits of 
their effort. The discussion leads to the following empirical predictions: 
Prediction 1: Sell-side coverage decreases following the implementation of MiFID II. 
Prediction 2: The reduction in sell-side coverage following the implementation of MiFID II is higher 
for firms that are less important to the sell-side industry. 
 
2.2.2 Sell-Side Research Quality 
Prior research argues that fewer analysts as a result of an exogenous shock at constant levels 
of demand mean lower competition and therefore lower quality of their work output (e.g., Hong and 
Kacperczyk 2010; Merkley et al. 2017). However, that prediction may not hold under MiFID II due 
to the transformation of equity research from a cost center into a profit center. 
11 
 
Unbundling implies that the sell-side would have to sell research directly to the buy-side in a 
setting in which the buy-side exercises price pressure and must justify the usefulness of external 
research. This new regime may therefore transform equity research from a cost center into a profit 
center. If so, the incentives of the sell-side change such that the ability to sell research and the 
capacity to keep costs down become essential. In other words, post-MiFID II, the sell-side 
investment res ,
. the optimal incentives of an agent who has specific knowledge 
depending on input- or output-based performance measurement and shows that only output-based 
performance measures incentivize the agent to use her knowledge efficiently. As the performance 
measure for the sell-side research unit is now profit, the analyst has incentives to use her knowledge 
in efficient ways and deliver high-quality research.  
In addition, Liu (2011) and Gu et al. (2013) provide evidence that decisions taken by sell-side 
analysts are driven by buy-side interest. Therefore, in order to be able to sell research directly, quality 
becomes a product-differentiation mechanism to relax price competition (Shaked and Sutton 1982) 
and attract buy-side business.10 Furthermore, because the buy-side must justify the usefulness of 
external research to their clients, the sell-side might increase the quality and usefulness of their 
research in order to facilitate such a justification and, thus, be able to sell their research. It is likely 
that the MiFID II-induced shake-up of investment firms and sell-side research will create new 
incentives for sell-side analysts with an increased emphasis on high quality outputs. This leads us to 
the following empirical prediction: 
Prediction 3: Sell-side analysts provide higher quality work outputs following the implementation of 
MiFID II. 
 
10 These arguments still hold for independent research firms that have always functioned as profit centers because MiFID 
II leads to a decrease in overall demand for research. 
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2.2.3 Buy-Side Response 
As discussed, the public good feature of sell-side research (Kelly and Ljungqvist 2012) 
reduces incentives for buy-side firms to separately pay for it under the new hard dollar regime. 
Instead, buy-side firms have incentives to shift the resources to increase their internal research 
capabilities. Considering that most buy-side firms announced that they will absorb the costs 
themselves rather than pass them on to their clients (Riding 2019a), a natural reaction would be to cut 
out the third party and to increase the cost efficiency of research expenses by producing research 
internally (Chen, Kelly, and Wu 2020). The re-orientation toward internal research is likely to be 
strengthened by the requirement for buy-side managers to justify the usefulness of consumed sell-
side research, which does not apply to investment research generated internally. Because buy-side 
analysts make stock recommendations and forecasts exclusively to the fund manager (Cheng et al. 
2006), the information signals they produce can be kept private, which increases the value of internal 
research as it generates an information advantage (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Therefore, we 
predict that the buy-side will compensate for the endogenous decision to cut the consumption of sell-
side research with increased efforts to produce research internally: 
Prediction 4: Buy-side increases in-house equity investment research efforts following the 
implementation of MiFID II. 
 
2.2.4 Firm Information Environment Effects 
Further, we consider environment. Our 
predictions so far point to conflicting impacts on listed firms. On one hand, considering that sell-side 
he decreased 
provision of sell-side equity research could harm the information environment of listed firms 
13 
 
(Merton 1987; Kelly and Ljungqvist 2007, 2012) through the loss of a public signal.11 On the other 
hand, the separate pricing of research strengthens the incentives of sell-side analysts, which would 
lead to higher quality of research output and could have a positive effect. To the extent that markets 
infer private buy-side research from the invest more buy-side research 
could also have a positive effect. Therefore, the overall effect of MiFID II on firm-level information 
asymmetry is an empirical question. 
 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Construction  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample-construction process. We begin with all public firms 
headquartered in 30 EEA countries, over the period from 2015 to February 2019, with data available 
in Compustat Global and the IBES Summary History file.12 If a firm has never had analyst coverage 
during the sample period, it is excluded from the sample. If the firm has had coverage for some 
periods during the sample period, we include it in the sample after the first time it appears covered.13 
The full (PSM matched) European sample is 11,136 (9,709) firm-year observations, which 
constitutes the treated sample. 
Our reliance on a European sample of corporate issuers rests on the following assumption. 
MiFID II applies directly to EEA-based investment firms, their third-country subsidiaries, and non-
EEA-based investment firms that operate in the EEA. The corporate issuers affected are the ones 
traded by investment firms that fall under MiFID II. This information is not publicly available; 
therefore, we assume that EEA investment firms trade in corporate issuers headquartered in Europe. 
 
11 Less publicly available research might primarily affect retail investors. We thank Richard Sloan for this point. 
12 Iceland did not implement MiFID II so we exclude it. 
13 For example, if a firm has no sell-side coverage for 2015, has coverage for 2016, and no coverage afterwards, we 
include it in the sample starting in 2016, with zero coverage for 2017 and 2018. 
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We provide results from pre-post MiFID II for the European sample only, and control-sample 
and matching-based difference-in-differences (DiD) approaches. The latter controls for time-period 
specific effects that might confound results. Mirroring the European sample-construction steps, we 
gather a control group composed of U.S. and Canadian firms over the same period.14 We employ 
U.S. and Canadian firms as they tend to be economically similar to European firms, but not directly 
regulated by the directive we examine (Mulherin 2007). There are 11,605 (7,409) U.S. and 2,560 
(1,960) Canadian firm-year observations in the full (PSM matched) sample. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of the full and matched samples by the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. We note that Other industries represent 16% (21%) of the full 
(PSM) sample, followed by Business Equipment 16% (17%) and Finance 15% (10%).15 Panel C of 
Table 1 presents the distribution of firms in the full and matched samples by country in which the 
firm is headquartered. .K. contributes 30% of the 
European sample, followed by France, Germany, and Sweden. 
 
3.2 Research Design for Sell-Side Research Quantity 
We test our first prediction on the impact of MiFID II on sell-side coverage in a DiD research 
design using the full sample of treated and control firms. TREAT equals 1 for companies 
headquartered in European countries (i.e., treatment sample), and 0 for companies headquartered in 
Canada and the U.S. (i.e., control sample). POST equals 1 if the value of the dependent variable is 
based on data on or after January 3, 2018 (i.e., post-MiFID II), and 0 otherwise (i.e., pre-MiFID II). 
Equation (1) specifies the full model. 
 
14 We use a pre-trend test to provide insight into the parallel-trend assumption by including indicators for the pre-period 
years interacted with TREAT (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Untabulated results show that, before treatment, the treated and 
control groups are parallel for the sell-side and buy-side dependent variables. 






where the dependent variable is in turn the number of sell-side analysts covering the firm (Coverage) 
and an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for companies that completely lose their sell-side 
coverage, and 0 otherwise (Complete Coverage Loss). The latter captures situations where analyst 
coverage for a firm goes from positive to zero during our sample period. 
Our focus is on TREAT×POST. 1 captures the incremental effect associated with 
implementing MiFID II in Europe relative to the same period in the U.S. and Canada. The firm fixed 
effects subsume the main effect for TREAT, and the year fixed effects subsume the main effect for 
POST, while allowing the pre-MiFID II period to vary. When Coverage is the dependent variable, a 
negative coefficient 1 would indicate an incremental decrease in sell-side coverage post-MiFID II in 
Europe relative to the U.S. and Canada and support Prediction 1. When Complete Coverage Loss is 
the dependent variable, a positive coefficient 1 means that a European firm is on average more likely 
to lose its entire sell-side following post-MiFID II relative to the control sample over the same 
period; this would provide further confirmation for Prediction 1. 
Equation (1) includes firm-level and country-level variables that could explain the level of 
analyst following or account for losses of analyst coverage. Firm-level controls follow prior research 
(e.g., Mola, Rau, and Khorana 2013) and comprise total assets (Size), firm profitability (ROA), an 
indicator for loss-making firms (Loss), book-to-market ratio (BTM), Firm Age, Leverage, Tangibility, 
R&D, Financing Activities, and Earnings Volatility. We also include two stock market-based 
variables: the previous six months  stock returns (Stock Return) and Return Volatility. The country-
level variables are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1 and 99% to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
Importantly, all models include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics that 
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could explain the level of the outcome variables and standard errors are robust, adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). The appendix details variable definitions.  
To reduce the concern that the treated and control groups are different prior to the 
implementation of MiFID II, we implement a DiD research design with Propensity-Score Matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We use data prior to the regulation to estimate the first-stage 
propensity score based on all firm-level control variables. We then match treated firms with the 
nearest neighbor control firm within the same Fama-French 12 industry group and a caliper distance 
of 0.05, which is 0.25 standard deviation of the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985), one-
to-one with replacement.16 Panel D of Table 2 shows the sample means before and after matching. 
We run Equation (1) on the PSM-matched sample and focus on interpreting the coefficient on 
TREAT×POST. 
We use an augmented version of Equation (1) to test Prediction 2. Specifically, we test 
whether the sell-side coverage effect of MiFID II is more likely to manifest for firms that are less 
important to the sell-side by adding an indicator variable and interacting it with TREAT×POST. We 
use four importance to the sell-side industry. Low Institutional 
Ownership is an indicator that takes the value 1 if one-year lagged institutional ownership in the firm 
is in the first tertile by country-year, and 0 otherwise. Small Firm is an indicator that takes the value 
1 if the firm is in the first tertile of total assets by country-year, and 0 otherwise. No Financing 
Activities takes the value 1 if the firm does not have an equity or debt offering in the prior, current, or 
subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. Low Trading Volume is 1 if the one-year lagged trading volume in 
 
16 Panel D of Table 2 shows that the matching process removes the differences in analyst coverage, raising external 
 stock returns between the two samples prior to the treatment and reduces to a large 
extent the economic differences on other dimensions (i.e., most variables are very close in terms of actual magnitudes). 
Our inferences are robust to stricter caliper choices such as 0.01, 0.005, or even 0.001. Using a stricter caliper further 
reduces the differences between the two groups, but also decreases the sample size significantly. For example, using a 
strict caliper of 0.001 removes the statistical differences between the treated and the control group prior to the treatment 
for size, coverage, ROA, firm age, leverage, R&D, stock returns, and earnings volatility. But the strict caliper choice 
reduces sample size to 7,641 observations. Again, our inferences remain the same using this matching choice. 
17 
 
millions of shares is in the bottom tertile by country-year, and 0 otherwise. To address the concern 
that the cross-sectional effects are mechanically driven by the pre-regulation analyst coverage level 
(e.g., small firms have lower coverage and are more likely to lose the entire coverage), we first 
orthogonalize firm size, institutional ownership, and trading volume, respectively, on analyst 
following and take the residual before defining the Small Firm, Low Institutional Ownership, and 
Low Trading Volume indicators, respectively. 
We expect the reduction in sell-side coverage to be incrementally higher for firms that are 
less important to the sell-side industry. A negative (positive) coefficient on the triple interaction term 
when Coverage (Complete Coverage Loss) is the dependent variable would confirm Prediction 2. 
 
3.3 Research Design for Sell-Side Research Quality 
We test Prediction 3 in an analyst-firm balanced setting where the sample contains only those 
analysts who are present in IBES Detail both before and after MiFID II covering the same firm. In 
other words, this is a stringent test of the quality of sell-side research delivered by the same analyst 
but in periods with different incentives. Analysts who follow European firms are the treatment 
sample, and analysts who follow U.S. or Canadian firms are the control sample. For this test, we rely 




First, we analyze whether remaining sell-side analysts make more accurate forecasts after MiFID II 
compared to their own accuracy, for the same firm, before MiFID II, which implies higher quality 
forecasts. The dependent variable is the earnings forecast error (Forecast Error) and the sample is at 
the forecast level (156,448 full sample, of which 51,603 treatment observations). The term of interest 
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is TREAT×POST; the coefficient 1 shows the impact of MiFID II on sell-
accuracy compared to sell-side analysts who cover U.S. and Canadian firms. A negative coefficient 
1 means that forecast errors are lower in Europe after MiFID II and would provide support for 
Prediction 3. 
Second, to further substantiate the evidence on sell-side research quality, we test the 
perceived quality of stock recommendations made by sell-side analysts after MiFID II. To the extent 
that the sell-side profession under MiFID II competes for limited buy-side research payments and 
attention, economic intuition suggests that sell-side analysts may seek to increase the usefulness of 
their final product, that is, their stock recommendations. Following Kadan et al. (2009), we test the 
unconditional informativeness of stock recommendations issued by analysts present in the sample 
both before and after MiFID II (62,896 full-sample observations, of which 33,250 are treatment 
observations). The dependent variable is the absolute cumulative abnormal returns over two days 
following the release of the stock recommendation, Abs CAR (0;+1). A positive coefficient 1 would 
lend support to Prediction 3 as it shows that the overall informativeness of stock recommendations 
increases after MiFID II. 
Third, because MiFID II forces the buy-side to reassess the sources of research they use, we 
expect sell-side analysts will want to make themselves useful or indispensable by producing 
information that the buy-side values. In surveys, buy-side fund managers and analysts consistently 
rank industry knowledge as the most important sell-side research attribute (Bradshaw 2012; Brown, 
Call, Clement, and Sharp 2016). Industry recommendations contain information beyond that in stock 
recommendations and taking them into account increases the profitability of stock recommendations 
(Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach 2012). Therefore, we also evaluate whether the sell-side caters 
more to the buy-side by providing information they know the buy-side uses: industry 
recommendations. We use the IBES Detail Recommendation file and the method described by Kadan 
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et al. (2012) and test whether stock recommendations for European firms are more likely to be 
accompanied by industry recommendations after MiFID II (i.e., a positive coefficient 1), which 
would imply that sell-side analysts cater to the buy-side to a greater extent. 
Following prior research on analyst output quality (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1999; 
Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Bradley, Gokkaya, Liu, and Xie 2017; Merkley et al. 
2017; Fang and Hope 2020), we include a range of analyst-level controls that may explain our 
dependent variables. s general sell-side experience 
and specific experience with the firm for which she provides research. We also include proxies for 
year. To account for analysts employed by larger brokers having more resources available, we 
control for broker size. For the forecast accuracy test, we additionally control for forecast horizon 
and analyst effort measured as the number of forecasts issued for the firm during the year. Finally, 
we also include the firm- and country-level controls, to account for differences in firm characteristics 
and country institutions.17 
 
3.4 Research Design for Buy-Side Response 
We predict that the buy-side increases its internal investment research efforts following the 
implementation of MiFID II (Prediction 4). Unlike sell-side research, buy-side research is proprietary 
and rarely available to outsiders (Cheng et al. 2006), including to researchers, as the analyst works 
 
17 We do not tabulate analyst-firm level tests on a PSM sample as this requires a whole new set of variable selections for 
stage-one model and balance checks. Matching on firm characteristics, analyst experience, number of covered firms, and 
broker size results in a sample of 95,129 observations. Using Forecast Error as dependent variable in the most restrictive 
research design (with firm-year-analyst fixed effects and standard errors clustered by analyst and firm), the coefficient on 
TREAT×POST t-
coverage as matching dimension, on the recommendation-level sample yields 43,621 matched observations. When Abs 
CAR (0;+1) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on TREAT×POST is not significant at conventional levels. Using 
Industry Recommendation as dependent variable in the same restrictive research design, the coefficient on TREAT×POST 
is 0.026, marginally significant (t-stat 1.75). Overall, the PSM results lend further, albeit weaker, support to Prediction 3. 
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exclusively for the investment firm that hires her.18 Hence, we cannot directly observe the resources 
buy-side spend on internal research. We overcome this data limitation by employing indirect proxies 
for buy-side equity research effort. 
First, an increase in buy-side research effort could manifest in the buy-side hiring more 
analysts. Inspired by Brown et al. (2016), we examine the number of buy-side analysts in European 
investment firms before and after MiFID II . We 
obtain a list of contact information of all buy-side equity analysts affiliated with investment firms on 
June 12, 2017 (before MiFID II), and another list on April 3, 2019 (after MiFID II). We keep only 
investment firms that appear in both lists and operate in either any of the EEA countries (treatment 
group) or in the U.S. or Canada (control group), and retain only those individuals whose current title 
is (buy-side) security analyst or associate analyst. 19  We use the number of buy-side analysts 
employed by each investment firm as the dependent variable in Equation (3). The model includes 
POST and its interaction with TREAT, a categorical variable capturing the size of investment firms 




We expect a positive coefficient on 2, which would indicate an increase in the number of buy-side 
analysts at European investment firms relative to the control group post-MiFID II. 
Second, we consider a setting where buy-side analysts and corporate management interact 
directly and publicly. In particular, we look at whether buy-side analysts become more active in 
corporate conference calls, which is part of their fundamental research and due diligence. For 
instance, Jung, Wong, and Zhang (2018) show that buy-side analysts are more likely to participate in 
 
18 Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman (2008) and Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim, and Shanthikumar (2013) provide the first 
insight into buy-side research using proprietary data from a large investment firm between 1997 and 2004. Brown et al. 
(2016) provide cross-firm evidence on buy-side research using surveys. 
19 We remove 263 investment firms that operate simultaneously in European countries and the U.S. or Canada. 
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conference -side coverage is low. 
(Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 2013). Nevertheless, given the potential decrease in sell-side 
coverage due to MiFID II, we expect more buy-side analysts to attend conference calls and to ask 
more questions in order to acquire information for their own research.  
We follow Jung et al. (2018) and Call, Sharp, and Shohfi (2018) and use conference call 
transcripts to identify the number of buy-side analysts participating in the calls as well as the number 
of questions they ask. Specifically, we download the annual earnings call transcripts from FactSet, 
and parse the list of participants to obtain the name, job, and employer of the non-corporate 
participants. 20  We then generate three variables measuring buy- interactions with 
corporate management. Buy-Side Attendance is the number of buy-side analysts attending the call. 
Buy-Side Questions is the number of interactions between buy-side analysts and management during 
the call; we truncate the count to 10 to eliminate interactions without information content (i.e., the 
analyst saying, -side analysts participate 
or the firm does not hold an earnings call in a firm-year, we set these variables to zero such that the 
sample is the same as the one used to estimate Equation (1).21 Buy-Side Engagement is the average 
number of interactions with management per buy-side analyst attending the call; this measure is 
conditional on buy-side attendance, which restricts the full (PSM) sample size to 1,589 (1,337) firm-
year observations. Equation (4) specifies the model. 
 
20 We implement the following procedure to identify the sell-side and buy-side analysts: (1) we match by name and 
employer the list of non-corporate participants with the list of sell-side analysts obtained from FactSet Contact Screening; 
(2) we match the remaining participants by name and employer with a list of buy-side managers and analysts obtained 
from FactSet Contact Screening, Thomson Reuters, and S&P Capital IQ; (3) we match the remaining participants by 
employer with the list of buy-side and sell-side firms from the same sources; (4) we isolate the remaining non-matched 
participants and manually code them as sell-side, buy-side, or other by searching for their employment information via 
LinkedIn, Bloomberg, and corporate websites. We manually coded over 9,000 individuals. 






where buy-side participation is measured, in turn, with Buy-Side Attendance, Buy-Side Questions, 
and Buy-Side Engagement. In addition to firm- and country-level controls that we include in 
Equation (1), we further control for sell-side coverage. We expect the coefficient on TREAT×POST 
to be positive, indicating an increase in buy-side analyst participation and engagement with 
management in earnings conference calls in the post-MiFID II period in Europe compared to the 
control sample. 
 
3.5 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The firms in the full 
sample are followed by an average of 8 analysts, and 1% have completely lost sell-side coverage 
during our sample period. The average firm has been listed for 15 years, has about $750 million in 
total assets, book-to-market ratio of 0.66, tangibility ratio of 0.22, and median ROA of 2%. 31% of 
firm-years have recorded losses and 50% have issued equity or debt financing. The average analyst 
covers about 17 firms from 4 different industries and publishes about 4 forecasts per firm-year. They 
work alongside 71 sell-side analysts at the same brokerage, have worked on the sell-side for 46 
quarters, and have followed a specific firm for an average of 17 quarters. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the difference in means across the European sample after to 
before MiFID II. The univariate difference in analyst coverage shows a significant decrease post-
MiFID II (i.e., from 7 to 6 analysts, on average), and the percentage of firms completely losing sell-
side coverage increases significantly post-MiFID II (i.e., from 1% to 8%). At the analyst level, we 
note the higher average experience (i.e., from 46 to 50 quarters post-MiFID II since first appearance 
on IBES), and the increase in the number of firms covered (i.e., from 13 to 14). 
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One key result from Panel B of Table 2 is the increase in the number of firms that lose sell-
side coverage completely after compared to before MiFID II implementation. Panel C explores this 
result further by comparing the European firms that lose all sell-side coverage (238 firms) with the 
European firms that remain covered (2,904 firms) in the first year of MiFID II implementation. The 
238 firms have at least one analyst following in 2017 and zero analysts following in 2018. Compared 
to the firms that remain covered, the firms that lose all coverage are smaller, younger, have lower 
institutional ownership, and are less likely to raise equity or debt. They are also less profitable, have 
more volatile earnings, and generate lower stock returns. These univariate results support our 
multivariate inquiry into the role of firm importance for sell-side coverage decisions after MiFID II 
comes into force. The following sections present the results from empirical analyses on sell-side 
effects, buy-side effects, as well as additional tests on firm stock-market liquidity. 
 
4. Empirical Results for Sell-Side Effects 
4.1 Sell-Side Coverage (Test of Prediction 1) 
We report results on our first prediction in Table 3. We first examine the changes in analyst 
coverage (columns 1 to 5) upon MiFID II implementation for European compared to U.S. and 
Canadian firms. Column 1 reports results from a simple pre-post specification on the EU sample with 
no controls. Column 2 reports results from a DiD specification with no controls or fixed effects 
conducted on the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 subsequently add controls and firm and year fixed 
effects, and cluster standard errors by firm. Column 5 employs the same specification as in column 4 
but using the PSM sample. Overall, the results show a decrease in coverage following MiFID II for 
European firms, which also experience an incremental decrease in coverage relative to North 
American firms. The economic significance of the estimated coefficient on TREAT×POST in column 
4 indicates that the incremental decrease in coverage for an average European firm represents 0.44 / 
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7.19 = 6.12% of the pre-regulation level. 
Clearly, the most drastic outcome in terms of sell-side effects for firms would be a complete 
loss of analyst coverage; thus, to test the likelihood of this outcome, in columns 6 to 10 we replace 
Coverage by Complete Coverage Loss. Column 6 reports results based on the EU sample only; 
columns 7 to 9 report results from linear probability models and DiD designs. In column 7, without 
controls, the coefficient on TREAT×POST is positive and significant, suggesting that European firms 
have a higher likelihood of completely losing coverage after MiFID II compared to the North 
American firms used as control sample. Our multivariate DiD results on the full and PSM-matched 
samples reported in columns 8 to 10 further support this finding. Results in column 9 suggest that 
European firms, relative to North American firms, are 6% incrementally more likely to completely 
lose sell-side coverage after the MiFID II implementation. The impact of MiFID II on the loss of 
sell-side coverage is economically significant considering the mean value of 1% prior to MiFID II, 
which we view as a potentially serious consequence of the new regulation. Figure 1 allows a visual 
inspection of the dramatic increase in the percentage of firms that lose coverage entirely following 
the implementation of MiFID II in 2018 in Europe compared to North America. 
Taken together, the results in Table 3 provide support for our prediction that the unbundling 
requirements lead to a shrinking of the market for sell-side coverage. Therefore, these results provide 
supporting evidence for the concerns expressed by managers and the investment community (CFA 
Institute 2017; IR Magazine 2019) that firms will suffer a loss, and sometimes a complete loss, of 
sell-side coverage following the implementation of MiFID II. However, coverage loss is not 
universally undesirable. Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2019) find that, while 46% would prefer a 
higher analyst coverage, about 15% of the 610 investor relations officers surveyed would prefer a 
lower coverage of their firm. In the next section, we examine for which firms sell-side coverage 




4.2 Cross-Sectional Variations in Sell-Side Coverage (Test of Prediction 2) 
The effect of MiFID II on sell-side coverage is likely dependent on the firm s importance to 
the sell-side. To test Prediction 2, in Table 4 we redo the analyses in Table 3 and interact the 
TREAT×POST with Low Institutional Ownership, Small Firm, No Financing Activities, and Low 
Trading Volume, four indicator variables that proxy for less important firms. The models include 
firm fixed effects to capture time-invariant differences across firms and year fixed effects to control 
for general time trends. The triple interaction terms then capture cross-sectional variation in the DiD 
estimates. In other words, the triple interactions quantify the incremental strength of the effect of 
MiFID II implementation on sell-side coverage in Europe relative to North America across different 
groups of firms. 
In columns 1 to 4 of Table 4, the dependent variable is Coverage. In column 1, the coefficient 
on the triple interaction TREAT×POST×Low Institutional Ownership is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. In the presence of firm and year fixed effects, this significant coefficient suggests that 
the DiD estimate of the effect of MiFID II on analyst coverage is statistically stronger for the firms in 
the Low Institutional Ownership group than for other firms. The difference is also economically 
meaningful, representing a 0.258 / 0.366 = 70% larger decrease in analyst coverage for Low 
Institutional Ownership firms compared to other firms. In columns 2 to 4, the coefficients on 
TREAT×POST×Small Firm, TREAT×POST×No Financing Activities, and TREAT×POST×Low 
Trading Volume, respectively, are negative and significant at the 10% level or better, suggesting that 
less important European firms suffer greater losses in coverage post-MiFID II compared to North 
American counterparts. Economically, the effect is 143%, 102%, and 122% stronger for Small Firm, 
No Financing Activities, and Low Trading Volume firms, respectively, compared to other firms. 
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Overall, the results suggest that the effects of MiFID II on analyst coverage are significantly stronger 
for firms that are less important to the sell-side. 
In columns 5 to 8 of Table 4, we refine the analysis by using Complete Coverage Loss as the 
dependent variable. In the presence of firm and year fixed effects, the triple interaction terms capture 
the cross-sectional variation in the effect of MiFID II on losing analyst coverage completely across 
groups of firms. The coefficient on TREAT×POST×Low Institutional Ownership is positive and 
significant at the 1% level and the coefficients on TREAT×POST×Small Firm and 
TREAT×POST×No Financing Activities are positive and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 
on TREAT×POST×Low Trading Volume is positive but not statistically significant. These results 
suggest that European firms that are less important to the sell-side are incrementally more likely to 
lose coverage entirely following MiFID II compared to North American firms. 
To better interpret the triple interaction terms in Table 4 and further illustrate the economic 
significance of these results, Figure 2 plots the percentage of firms losing coverage completely before 
and after MiFID II in Europe compared to North America by the four proxies of firm importance for 
the sell-side. Consistent with the findings in Table 4, Figure 2 shows that the effect of MiFID II on 
the loss of entire analyst coverage is stronger for firms that are less important to the sell-side. Panel A 
shows that, among European (North American) firms, the percentage of firms with low institutional 
ownership that lose all sell-side coverage jumps from 0.5% (0.4%) before to 13.8% (1.5%) after 
MiFID II implementation, whereas for the other European (North American) firms, the percentage of 
firms that lose sell-side coverage increases from 0.5% (0.03%) to 4.2% (0.2%). In terms of firm size, 
Panel B indicates that about 10.4% (6.2%) of small (large) European firms lose sell-side coverage 
after MiFID II implementation, compared to 1.3% (0.5%) for the control group. Panel C shows that, 
among the European firms that have (do not have) financing activities, 5.4% (9.7%) lose sell-side 
coverage entirely after MiFID II compared to 0.6% (0.5%) before MiFID II. In Panel D, we consider 
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the split into low and high trading volume. After MiFID II implementation, the percentage of 
European (North American) firms with low trading volume that loses sell-side coverage is 10.5% 
(0.8%), compared to 7.5% (0.7%) among the rest of the firms. These graphs are consistent with the 
findings in Table 4 that the DiD estimates of MiFID II implementation are significantly stronger for 
firms that have lower institutional ownership, are smaller, do not have financing activities, or have 
lower trading volume. 
Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 and Figure 2 indicates that sell-side analysts re-
allocate their limited resources after MiFID II based on the importance of the covered firms. That 
being said, an intended objective of MiFID II is to improve sell-side independence, which prior 
literature suggests benefits firms in terms of higher quality forecasts and less biased analyst behavior 
(e.g., Chen and Chen 2009; Kadan et al. 2009). In the next section, we examine changes in analyst 
forecast characteristics following MiFID II to provide further insight into the costs and benefits 
debate around the unbundling mechanism. 
 
4.3 Sell-Side Research Quality (Test of Prediction 3) 
The fact that sell-side analysts need to separately price research and to the extent that the sell-
side profession under MiFID II competes for limited buy-side research payments and attention, 
economic intuition suggests that sell-side analysts may seek to increase the quality of their research. 
Panel A of Table 5 reports results from regressions that test individual analyst forecast errors in the 
post-MiFID II period. In column 1, the coefficient on POST is negative and significant, suggesting in 
a univariate specification that the magnitude of earnings forecast errors decreases in Europe after 
MiFID II. Column 2 reports results from a specification of Equation (2) without fixed effects on the 
full sample of treated and control observations. The coefficient on TREAT×POST is negative and 
significant suggesting that forecast errors of analysts covering European firms after MiFID II 
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decreased compared to analysts covering U.S. or Canadian firms. We also provide results with 
different sets of fixed effects. Regardless of specification, we find that forecast errors have decreased 
for the analysts who remain after MiFID II, consistent with higher-quality work being conducted in 
the post-MiFID II period. 
Next, we assess the informativeness of analyst stock recommendations to provide insight into 
the structural changes induced by the MiFID II implementation to sell-side research. Following 
Kadan et al. (2009), we use the absolute value of abnormal returns to stock recommendations as a 
measure of unconditional informativeness. In Panel B of Table 5, columns 1 through 4, the 
dependent variable is the absolute value of two-day market-adjusted returns. The coefficient on 
POST is positive and significant in column 1 where we use only European firms, suggesting the 
average absolute two-day abnormal market reaction has increased by about 0.3% from about 2.8%, a 
moderate increase of about 11% in the overall informativeness of stock recommendations. We 
introduce control firms, analyst-level, and firm-level controls, fixed effects, and double clustering 
gradually from columns 2 to 4. TREAT×POST captures the incremental abnormal market reaction to 
stock recommendations for European firms relative to control firms following the implementation of 
MiFID II, and is positive and significant, as predicted. In general, the results in columns 1 to 4 
indicate an increase in overall informativeness of stock recommendations for European firms in the 
MiFID II era. 
In Panel B of Table 5, columns 5 to 8 report results where the dependent variable, Industry 
Recommendation, equals 1 if a stock recommendation is accompanied by an industry 
recommendation, and 0 otherwise. In column 5 where the sample is limited to European firms, the 
coefficient on POST is positive and significant at the 5% level. We gradually introduce controls, 
fixed effects, and standard error clustering in columns 6 to 8. In the most restrictive specification, the 
coefficient on TREAT×POST is positive and significant at 5%. Relative to North American firms, 
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stock recommendations for European firms are more likely to be accompanied by industry 
recommendations after MiFID II implementation. Overall, the evidence is consistent with sell-side 
analysts increasingly providing industry recommendations, which are incrementally informative 
relative to stock recommendations (Kadan et al. 2012), after MiFID II. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 provide support for our Prediction 3. The decrease in the public 
signals provided by sell-side coverage we document previously could imply a mechanical increase in 
stock-recommendation informativeness post-MiFID II. However, taken together with the increase in 
forecast accuracy and provision of industry recommendations, the effect we capture is likely that of 
an overall increase in sell-side research quality. In addition, recall that the analysts included in this 
test issued forecasts or stock recommendations both before and after MiFID II, and that the tests 
control for the level of experience on the sell-side. Therefore, these results indicate that the 
unbundling mechanism in MiFID II triggered a change in sell-side incentives, which in turn leads to 
higher sell-side research quality. 
 
5. Empirical Results for Buy-Side Effects (Test of Prediction 4) 
Due to buy-side research data unavailability, we test Prediction 4 indirectly using the number 
of buy-side analysts and buy-side participation in, and engagement with managers, during conference 
calls as proxies for research effort. Table 6 reports the results of estimating Equation (3) on the 
sample of investment firms at two points in time before and after MiFID II. The dependent variable 
(#Buy-Side) is the number of buy-side analysts. In column 1 that is based solely on the EU sample, 
we find a positive coefficient on POST, which indicates an increase in the number of buy-side 
analysts employed by European investment firms post-MiFID II. In column 2, we run the regression 
using the full sample that includes both European and North American investment firms. The 
coefficient on TREAT×POST is positive and marginally significant, consistent with the prediction of 
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an increase in the number of buy-side analysts affiliated with European investment firms relative to 
North American investment firms under the MiFID II regime. 
To account for size differences, we assign investment firms into five groups based on their 
assets under management and match a European firm randomly with a control firm in the same asset 
group. Based on the matched sample, in column 3, we find similar evidence of an increase in the 
number of buy-side analysts in European investment firms relative to North American firms post-
MiFID II. We additionally control for Assets Under Management in column 4, and inferences remain 
similar. Overall, the findings in Table 6 provide indirect evidence that European investment firms 
turn to more in-house research after MiFID II. These are new findings to the literature and suggest an 
approach to measuring buy-side interest that can be applied in other settings. 
Next, we provide evidence on the buy-side analyst participation in conference calls after 
MiFID II. Figure 3 provides a visualization of the increase in Buy-Side Engagement (i.e., average 
number of questions by buy-side analyst, conditional on participation) in conference calls post-
MiFID II in Europe (242 observations); the increase is of about 1 additional question per buy-side 
participating in the call (simple t-test of difference in means is significant at 10% two-tailed). Buy-
side engagement with North American firms (1,347 observations) does not exhibit the same change. 
Table 7 reports the DiD results from tests of buy-side analyst participation in conference calls 
following MiFID II implementation. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is Buy-Side 
Attendance. The coefficient on TREAT×POST is positive and significant, consistent with an increase 
in the number of buy-side analysts participating in earnings conference calls of EU firms relative to 
North American firms after MiFID II comes into force. In terms of economic significance, the 
incremental increase of buy-side analyst participation for EU firms relative to North American firms 
is 2.3%, which is comparable to the pre-regulation level of 2.26%. In an untabulated test, we find 
some marginally significant evidence suggesting that buy-side attendance is higher for firms that 
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completely lose sell-side coverage. We replace, in column 3, Buy-Side Attendance with Buy-Side 
Questions, and find evidence suggesting that buy-side analysts ask more questions in earnings 
conference calls of EU firms after MiFID II implementation. In column 5, we restrict the sample to 
only those earnings conference calls with buy-side participation and use Buy-Side Engagement as the 
dependent variable. The results show an increase in the average number of interactions between buy-
side analysts and management. Using a PSM-matched sample in columns 2, 4, and 6 produces 
findings similar to those reported in columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively. 
Overall, the results in Table 7 provide evidence that buy-side analysts increase their 
interaction with corporate management in earnings calls post-MiFID II in Europe compared to North 
America. In other words, this test provides further indirect evidence of increased research effort after 
MiFID II. Together with the results in Table 6, these findings support our prediction that the 
European buy-side increases in-house research efforts as a response to MiFID II research 
unbundling. 
Improvements in sell-side research quality and increases in buy-side research after MiFID II 
implementation are both possible, and thus internally consistent. Even though the quality of sell-side 
research is higher after MiFID II, the buy- purchase research decreases given its 
public good nature and the requirement to justify its usefulness for providing investment advice. The 
effect is further enhanced by most buy-side firms deciding to absorb research costs using their own 
resources, instead of passing them on to clients, and being therefore more careful with external 
spending on research (see anecdotal evidence in Section 2.1). Nevertheless, our setting may be too 
specific to provide a complete answer to the still open question on the co-existence of buy-side and 
sell-side research when sell-side research is of high quality (see Groysberg et al. 2008; 2013).22 
 
 
22 We thank Andrew Call, our RAST conference discussant, for leading us to this discussion. 
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6. Empirical Results for Firm Stock Liquidity 
Despite MiFID II research unbundling targeting brokerages and investment firms, the equity 
research produced by the sell-side and consumed by the buy-side is, ultimately, about listed firms. In 
this section, we test the net effect of MiFID II on listed firms by examining changes in stock 
liquidity. 
Table 8 reports the results of our stock liquidity test conducted on the full (PSM) sample of 
21,409 (17,088) firm-year observations. Sample size decreases compared to the one used to estimate 
Equation (1) due to stock-market data availability. We control for the number of presentations at 
broker-hosted conferences during the year 
(Bushee, Jung, and Miller 2011; Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2014), as well as analyst 
following in addition to the firm- and country-level controls used in previous analyses. 
In columns 1 to 5 of Table 8, a larger bid-ask spread indicates lower liquidity. The coefficient 
on TREAT×POST is positive and significant across all columns, suggesting that European firms 
experience an incremental decrease in liquidity relative to control firms following MiFID II. In 
columns 6 to 10, we alternatively use Amihud s (2002) illiquidity ratio as an inverse proxy for 
liquidity and continue to find similar evidence. These results provide some evidence on the negative 
net effect of MiFID II on the information environment for European firms, at least in the short term, 
and echo the concern raised in various professional surveys that MiFID II could present a net cost to 
European companies.23 We caution, however, that other contemporaneous changes, such as those 
imposed by MiFID II in transaction reporting and high-frequency trading, could contribute to this 
result. Given the confounding factors, we refrain from interpreting the lower stock liquidity we 
 
23 The U.K. makes up a third of our European sample (Panel B of Table 1). Consequently, one might argue that our 
findings could be affected by Brexit. Results based on continental European firms as the treated sample provide similar 




observe in the short-term post-MiFID II as being driven solely by the unbundling requirement and 
the dynamics it leads to in the financial services industry. 
 
7. Conclusion 
MiFID II is a sweeping new regulation that affects Europe and has the potential to expand 
through the rest of the world. Due to this new regulation, equity research is no longer bundled with 
The unbundling requirement is a transparency-based mechanism 
meant to address the potential conflicts of interest in the financial services industry due to the use of 
research as inducement for trading. We test the implications of the unbundling requirement in MiFID 
II on sell-side analysts, buy-side firms, and firms.  
Regarding the sell-side, we provide results of a significant reduction in sell-side coverage and 
an increased likelihood of complete loss of coverage. Small firms, those having less institutional 
ownership, those not issuing financing, and those with lower trading volume are less important for 
the sell-side, and therefore more likely to suffer coverage losses. On the positive side, we show 
evidence consistent with the idea that MiFID II has changed the incentives of sell-side analysts who 
remain employed. Specifically, their research is higher quality: forecasts are more accurate, stock 
recommendations have greater information content, and industry recommendations are more frequent 
after MiFID II implementation. 
It is difficult for researchers to measure buy-side research activity and coverage of firms. We 
develop a new approach to gauge the buy-side effects by counting the number of individuals 
employed as buy-side analysts before and after the regulation. We find a significant increase in the 
number of buy-side analysts, suggesting that there is a substitution effect between loss of sell-side 
coverage and increased buy-side research effort. Furthermore, we document that buy-side analysts 
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increase their attendance and active participation in earnings conference calls of European firms after 
MiFID II implementation compared to North American firms. 
Whereas firms are hurt by losing analyst coverage, sell-side research quality increases. Also, 
the buy-side picks up some of the slack by investing more in in-house research.24,25 In other words, 
separate pricing for research reduces the scope of the sell-side industry but strengthens the incentives 
of remaining analysts and drives asset managers to reduce their spending on external research and 
generate more private research internally. Lastly, we show that stock-market liquidity has decreased, 
at least in the short term (i.e., within one year following MiFID II implementation). 
Beyond the practical implications of our findings, we contribute to the broad literature on 
conflicts of interest in the sell-side industry and to the specific literature on conflicts of interest 
generated by trading incentives. We examine the effects of, and responses to, a specific mechanism 
to address these conflicts of interest unbundling. Importantly, we contribute to the scant literature 
on the buy-side industry by providing 
mechanism. Considering the novelty of MiFID II as regulation, the wide ramifications of the 
unbundling requirement in the buy-side and sell-side industries should be informative to academics 
and practitioners, alike.  
 
24 Whether the newly hired buy-side analysts are former sell-side analysts is an interesting question. However, the costly 
data collection necessary to answer this question places it beyond the scope of this paper. 
25 It is possible that a new equilibrium will emerge in the long-term once the various market participants have adjusted to 
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Fig. 1 Percentage of European and North American firms that lose coverage completely in the 
years leading up to the MiFID II implementation and the first year of MiFID II implementation. 
Over this period, firms enter the sample in the first year when they are covered by at least one 
analyst. Data is from IBES Summary File 
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a    Firms with low versus high institutional ownership  
 
b                    Small versus large firms  
 




d         Firms with low versus high trading volume  
 
Fig. 2 Cross-sectional variation in complete coverage loss. This figure depicts the variation along 
four dimensions institutional ownership (Panel A), firm size (Panel B), financing activities 
(Panel C), and trading volume (Panel D) in the percentage of firms that lose all sell-side 
coverage before and after MiFID II implementation across European and North American firms. 
We orthogonalize institutional ownership, firm size, and trading volume, respectively, to the 
number of analysts covering a firm in order to remove the mechanical relation between these 
variables. We then create the indicator variables Low (High) Institutional Ownership, Small 
(Large) Firm, and Low (High) Trading Volume by assigning the value 1 (0) to observations with 
the residual in the bottom tertile (top two tertiles) by country-year, and 0 (1) otherwise. The 
variable Financing Activities (No Financing Activities) takes the value 1 (0) if the firm has (does 
not have) equity or debt offering in the prior, current, or subsequent year, and 0 (1) otherwise. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample construction. 





Fig. 3 Buy-side engagement with management. This figure plots the average number of 
interactions that buy-side analysts have with management during earnings conference calls (Buy-
Side Engagement) for European and North American firms, before and after MiFID II 
implementation, conditional on buy-side participation in the call. Panel A of Table 1 describes 











Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Variables of interest 
TREAT Indicator variable that takes the value 1 for observations in the treatment group, 





POST Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the value of the dependent variable is 





Dependent variables used for sell-side coverage tests 
Coverage -end (numest).  IBES  
Complete Coverage 
Loss 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm loses all coverage for the 
fiscal reporting period, and 0 otherwise. 
IBES  
Dependent variables used for sell-side work output quality tests 
Forecast Error Absolute value of actual EPS (actual) minus individual EPS forecast (forecast) 
scaled by absolute actual EPS. 
IBES 
Abs CAR (0;+1) Absolute value of cumulative abnormal returns two days around stock 
recommendations. Stock returns are adjusted using the main market index in 
each economy (i.e., S&P 500 for the U.S., TSX60 for Canada, STOXX Europe 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock recommendation is accompanied by an 
industry recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
IBES 
Dependent variables used for buy-side tests 
#Buy-Side Number of buy-side analysts employed by investment firms. Thomson 
Reuters 
Buy-Side Attendance Number of buy-side analysts attending the annual earnings conference call. If 
missing, the variable is set to 0. 
FactSet 
Buy-Side Questions Number of interactions between buy-side analysts and management during the 
annual earnings conference call. The variable is truncated at 10 to ensure that it 
captures meaningful interactions. If missing, the variable is set to 0. 
FactSet 
Buy-Side Engagement Average number of interactions between buy-side analysts and management 
during the annual earnings conference call, conditional on buy-side analyst 
attendance. 
FactSet 
Dependent variables used for stock liquidity tests 
Amihud Ratio Annual mean of the daily absolute return to the monetary unit trading volume 
on that day, as defined by Amihud (2002). 
CRSP and 
Datastream 




Management five categories: 1 = below $100 mil, 2 = $100 to $1,000 mil, 3 = $1,000 to 
$5,000 mil, 4 = $5,000 to $50,000 mil, 5 = beyond $50,000 mil. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
Broker Size Natural logarithm of the number of unique analysts at a brokerage firm in a 
year.  
IBES 
#Broker Conferences Number of broker-hosted conferences during a year; if missing, the variable is 
set to 0. 
FactSet  




Effort Number of forecasts issued by the analyst for the covered firm in a year.  IBES 
Firm Age Number of years between the first fiscal year that the firm appears in 




Firm Experience Number of quarters since the analyst-firm pair first appeared in IBES. IBES 
#Firms Covered Number of unique firms covered by the analyst in the current year. IBES 
GDP Growth Percentage change in GDP per capita. World Bank 
General Experience Number of quarters since the analyst first appeared in IBES. IBES 
Horizon Number of days between the forecast announcement date and the earnings 
announcement date. 
IBES 











Indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the firm has (does not have) a 
seasoned equity offering or debt offering in the prior, current, or subsequent 






Stock Return Buy-and-hold stock return over the six months prior to the fiscal year end. CRSP and 
Compustat 
Leverage Total liabilities (dlc+dltt) divided by total assets (at). Compustat 
Log (GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars. World Bank 
Loss Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if income before extraordinary items 






Indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the residual from the following 
regression is in the bottom tertile (top two tertiles) by country-year, and 0 (1) 
otherwise.
 





Low (High) Trading 
Volume 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the residual from the following 
regression is in the bottom tertile (top two tertiles) by country-year, and 0 (1) 
otherwise. 
 





R&D Research and development spending (xrd) scaled by total assets (at). Compustat 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the last 24 months. CRSP and 
Compustat 
ROA Income before extraordinary items (ib) divided by total assets at reporting 
period-end (at). 
Compustat 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets at reporting period-end (at). Compustat  
Small (Large) Firm Indicator variable that takes the value 1 (0) if the residual from the following 
regression is in the bottom tertile (top two tertiles) by country-year, and 0 (1) 
otherwise.  
 
where the firm size is regressed over sell-side coverage. Size is measured as 
total assets (at). 
Compustat and 
IBES 
Tangibility Tangible assets (ppent) scaled by total assets (at). Compustat 




Table 1: Sample 
Panel A: Sample construction 
Sample 
Treated sample  Control sample Total 
observations Europe  U.S. Canada 




12,806 3,038 31,624 
Less missing accounting and stock price data (2,174)  (1,120) (301)  
Keep firm-years after the first available forecast  (1,470)  (81) (177)  
Full sample 11,136  11,605 2,560 25,301 
      
PSM sample 9,709  7,409 1,960 19,078 
      
Forecast-level sample 51,603  95,278 9,567 156,448 
   Number of unique firms 2,752  3,665 721 6,838 
   Number of unique brokers 308  270 116 588 
   Number of unique analysts 3,266  3,273 761 6,562 
      
Recommendation-level sample 33,250  25,065 4,581 62,896 
      
Liquidity sample 9,099  10,984 1,326 21,409 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firm-year observations by industry 
Fama-French 12 Industry Code 
Full Sample  PSM Sample 
Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Consumer Non-Durables 1,417 5.60%  1,303 6.83% 
Consumer Durables 557 2.20%  436 2.29% 
Manufacturing 2,589 10.24%  2,366 12.40% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 1,301 5.16%  678 3.55% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 630 2.49%  476 2.50% 
Business Equipment 3,982 15.73%  3,184 16.69% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 659 2.61%  510 2.67% 
Utilities 586 2.31%  332 1.74% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 2,296 9.07%  1,784 9.35% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 3,316 13.10%  2,084 10.92% 
Finance 3,800 15.01%  1,848 9.69% 
Other 4,168 16.48%  4,077 21.37% 
Total 25,301 100.00%  19,078 100.00% 




Panel C: Distribution of sample firm-year observations by country 
Country 
Full Sample  PSM Sample 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
European Economic Area      
Austria 139 0.55%  136 0.71% 
Belgium 229 0.91%  205 1.07% 
Bulgaria 51 0.20%  33 0.17% 
Croatia 40 0.16%  31 0.16% 
Cyprus 53 0.21%  43 0.23% 
Czech Republic 26 0.10%  6 0.03% 
Denmark 220 0.87%  182 0.95% 
Estonia 37 0.15%  29 0.15% 
Finland 407 1.61%  351 1.84% 
France 1,466 5.79%  1,339 7.02% 
Germany 1,255 4.96%  1,116 5.85% 
Greece 101 0.40%  90 0.47% 
Hungary 20 0.08%  16 0.08% 
Ireland 140 0.55%  122 0.64% 
Italy 695 2.75%  631 3.31% 
Latvia 11 0.04%  6 0.03% 
Lithuania 19 0.08%  14 0.07% 
Luxembourg 79 0.31%  51 0.27% 
Malta 11 0.04%  11 0.06% 
Netherlands 312 1.23%  280 1.47% 
Norway 503 1.99%  434 2.27% 
Poland 696 2.75%  557 2.92% 
Portugal 82 0.32%  75 0.39% 
Slovenia 28 0.11%  23 0.12% 
Spain 337 1.33%  306 1.60% 
Sweden 884 3.49%  774 4.06% 
United Kingdom 3,295 13.02%  2,848 14.93% 
Sub-total treated group 11,136 44.01%  9,709 50.89% 
Control group      
Canada 2,560 10.12%  1,960 10.27% 
United States 11,605 45.87%  7,409 38.84% 
Sub-total control group 14,165 55.99%  9,369 49.11% 
Total 25,301 100.00%  19,078 100.00% 
This table shows the firm-year sample distribution by country for the full and PSM matched samples 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Full-sample descriptive statistics over the period 2015 to 2019 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Firm-year observations 
Coverage 25,301 8.14 7.76 2.00 5.00 11.00 
Complete Coverage Loss 25,301 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Size 25,301 6.61 2.91 4.79 6.77 8.47 
ROA 25,301 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Loss 25,301 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BTM 25,301 0.66 0.72 0.25 0.49 0.85 
Firm Age 25,301 14.71 13.59 4.00 11.00 20.00 
Leverage 25,301 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.20 0.36 
Tangibility  25,301 0.22 0.25 0.02 0.11 0.32 
R&D 25,301 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Financing Activities 25,301 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Stock Return 25,301 0.20 0.77 0.00 0.08 0.21 
Earnings Volatility 25,301 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Return Volatility 25,301 0.34 0.88 0.07 0.11 0.21 
Institutional Ownership 25,301 51.28 54.45 1.30 53.35 87.09 
Trading Volume 23,572 169.07 315.58 8.43 41.73 160.98 
GDP Growth 25,301 2.26 1.17 1.57 2.22 2.86 
Log (GDP per Capita) 25,301 10.79 0.33 10.66 10.95 11.00 
Buy-side Attendance 25,301 0.07 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Buy-side Questions 25,301 0.38 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Buy-side Engagement 1,589 6.21 3.79 4.00 5.00 8.00 
Bid-Ask Spread 21,409 0.92 1.68 0.07 0.27 1.00 
Amihud Ratio 21,409 0.26 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.06 
#Broker Conferences 21,409 2.14 2.90 0.00 1.00 3.00 
Earnings forecast-level observations 
Forecast Error 156,448 0.20 0.41 0.01 0.05 0.16 
Effort 156,448 4.20 2.32 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Horizon 156,448 3.80 2.26 2.60 3.30 4.00 
Firm Experience 156,448 16.97 18.25 4.00 12.00 24.00 
General Experience 156,448 46.33 35.41 17.00 36.00 71.00 
#Firms Covered 156,448 16.95 8.99 11.00 16.00 21.00 
#Industries Covered 156,448 4.06 2.82 2.00 3.00 6.00 
Broker Size (raw) 156,448 71.22 65.53 22.00 49.00 102.00 
Stock recommendation-level observations 
Abs CAR (0;+1) 62,896 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Industry Recommendation 62,896 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. Panel A of Table 1 
describes the sample. Sample size decreases for Trading Volume, Amihud Ratio and Bid-Ask Spread due to data 
availability. Buy-side Engagement is conditional on buy-side analyst participation in the earnings conference call
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Panel B: Comparison of European firms after to before MiFID II implementation 
  Before   After 
Change t-value p>|t|  N Mean  N Mean 
Coverage 7,994 7.19  3,142 6.16 1.02 6.44 0.00 
Complete Coverage Loss 7,994 0.01  3,142 0.08 0.07 21.92 0.00 
Size 7,994 6.14  3,142 6.14 0.01 0.06 0.95 
ROA 7,994 0.01  3,142 0.02 0.01 2.50 0.01 
Loss 7,994 0.26  3,142 0.28 0.02 2.03 0.04 
BTM 7,994 0.73  3,142 0.79 0.06 3.11 0.00 
Firm Age 7,994 10.17  3,142 11.20 1.06 6.65 0.00 
Leverage 7,994 0.21  3,142 0.21 0.00 0.76 0.45 
Tangibility  7,994 0.20  3,142 0.19 0.01 1.01 0.31 
R&D 7,994 0.03  3,142 0.04 0.01 2.12 0.03 
Financing Activities 7,994 0.37  3,142 0.49 0.12 11.93 0.00 
Stock Return 7,994 0.48  3,142 0.46 0.02 1.10 0.27 
Earnings Volatility 7,994 0.02  3,142 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.68 
Return Volatility 7,994 0.53  3,142 0.50 0.03 0.87 0.39 
Institutional Ownership 7,994 35.69  3,142 40.69 5.00 5.34 0.00 
Trading Volume 6,960 99.73  2,786 103.88 4.15 0.74 0.46 
GDP Growth 7,994 2.30  3,142 2.03 0.27 7.94 0.00 
Log (GDP per Capita) 7,994 10.55  3,142 10.63 0.08 10.29 0.00 
General Experience 34,319 45.58  17,284 49.89 4.31 12.69 0.00 
Firm Experience 34,319 16.50  17,284 16.53 0.03 0.14 0.89 
Broker Size (raw) 34,319 95.91  17,284 83.42 12.49 15.27 0.00 
#Industries Covered 34,319 4.20  17,284 4.60 0.4 14.16 0.00 
#Firms Covered 34,319 12.67  17,284 13.96 1.29 16.15 0.00 
This table provides difference in means statistics comparing the sample of European firms after to before MiFID II 
implementation (i.e., 2018 2019 compared to 2015 2017). Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample construction. 
Sample size varies based on the unit of observation (firm-year or firm-year-analyst). Continuous variables are 





Panel C: Comparison between European firms that lose sell-side coverage completely after 
MiFID II implementation and European firms that remain covered 
  
Firms that Lose 
Coverage 
Completely 





  N Mean N Mean 
Size 238 3.36 2,904 6.37 3.01 18.07 0.00 
ROA 238 0.11 2,904 0.01 0.10 4.59 0.00 
Loss 238 0.47 2,904 0.26 0.21 6.44 0.00 
BTM 238 1.18 2,904 0.76 0.42 5.06 0.00 
Firm Age 238 8.77 2,904 11.39 2.62 6.32 0.00 
Leverage 238 0.22 2,904 0.21 0.01 0.51 0.61 
Tangibility  238 0.23 2,904 0.19 0.04 2.25 0.03 
R&D 238 0.03 2,904 0.04 0.01 0.66 0.51 
Financing Activities 238 0.35 2,904 0.50 0.15 4.82 0.00 
Stock Return 238 0.18 2,904 0.48 0.30 8.31 0.00 
Earnings Volatility 238 0.04 2,904 0.02 0.02 4.87 0.00 
Returns Volatility 238 0.21 2,904 0.53 0.32 7.34 0.00 
Institutional Ownership 238 21.86 2,904 42.23 20.37 2.92 0.00 
Trading Volume 236 96.14 2,550 104.6 8.46 0.46 0.65 
GDP Growth 238 2.58 2,904 1.98 0.60 5.52 0.00 
Log (GDP per Capita) 238 10.38 2,904 10.65 0.27 7.48 0.00 
The table compares the cross-section of European firms that lose sell-side coverage completely after MiFID II 
implementation with the European firms that remain covered. In the year prior to MiFID II implementation, all firms 
in this sample were covered by the sell-side. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. All variables are 




Panel D: Balance check for treated and control samples before and after PSM matching 
 Before PSM Matching  After PSM Matching 
  Mean 
%bias 
t-test  Mean 
%bias 
t-test 
Variable Treated Control t-value p>|t|  Treated Control t-value p>|t| 
Coverage 7.06 9.07 26.40 10.27 0.00  6.76 6.69 0.90 0.37 0.71 
Size 6.00 7.02 35.10 14.11 0.00  5.95 6.12 5.50 2.13 0.03 
ROA 0.01 0.06 21.20 8.10 0.00  0.01 0.04 9.90 3.97 0.00 
Loss 0.26 0.34 18.60 7.21 0.00  0.26 0.33 13.80 4.96 0.00 
BTM 0.66 0.51 23.70 9.40 0.00  0.65 0.57 12.00 4.00 0.00 
Firm Age 10.56 18.27 60.60 22.67 0.00  10.46 9.42 8.20 4.45 0.00 
Leverage 0.20 0.27 29.50 11.31 0.00  0.20 0.21 5.30 1.99 0.05 
Tangibility 0.19 0.23 13.00 4.99 0.00  0.19 0.24 18.40 6.69 0.00 
R&D 0.03 0.06 24.60 9.36 0.00  0.03 0.04 7.10 3.20 0.00 
Financing Activities 0.45 0.64 38.90 15.21 0.00  0.44 0.46 3.40 1.20 0.23 
Stock Return 0.48 0.06 54.90 22.58 0.00  0.37 0.37 0.80 0.31 0.75 
Earnings Volatility 0.02 0.03 23.40 8.84 0.00  0.02 0.03 11.30 4.74 0.00 
Return Volatility 0.53 0.19 37.00 15.16 0.00  0.41 0.28 13.90 5.87 0.00 
This table shows the balance check between the treated (European) and control (North American) group before and 
after PSM matching. The sample includes 25,301 firm-year observations before matching, and 19,078 firm-year 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: The Impact of MiFID II on Sell-  
Panel A: Forecast accuracy in the analyst-firm sample balanced before and after MiFID II 
implementation 
 Variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast Error 
Pre-Post  Difference-in-Differences 
EU Sample  Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
TREAT×POST   0.032*** 0.029*** 0.027** 
      
POST 0.011***  0.009***   
   (3.39)   
TREAT   0.090***   
   (26.48)   
Effort   0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 
   (0.41)   
Horizon   0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
   (24.31) (19.82) (18.52) 
Firm Experience   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
      
General Experience   0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
     (1.52) 
#Firms Covered   0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
#Industries Covered   0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.60)  
Broker Size   0.008*** 0.000 0.002 
      
Size   0.008*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
      
ROA   0.191*** 0.057 0.053 
   (21.70) (1.13) (1.05) 
Loss   0.346*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 
   (116.09) (11.52) (11.54) 
BTM   0.075*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
   (44.56) (4.28) (4.24) 
Firm Age   0.001*** 0.014 0.004 
    (0.29) (0.09) 
Leverage   0.069*** 0.133*** 0.128** 
   (13.76) (2.63) (2.56) 
Tangibility   0.127*** 0.070 0.073 
   (31.37)   
R&D   0.309*** 0.048 0.048 
      
Financing Activities   0.000 0.006 0.005 
   (0.11)   
Stock Return   0.019*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
    (2.62) (2.71) 
Earnings Volatility   0.889*** 0.626*** 0.639*** 
   (25.93) (3.93) (4.02) 
Return Volatility   0.018*** 0.003 0.004 
   (9.61)   
GDP Growth   0.007*** 0.004 0.004 
54 
 
      
Log (GDP per Capita)   0.012** 0.055 0.059 
    (0.51) (0.55) 
Constant 0.242***  0.232*** 0.581 0.449 
 (106.38)  (4.06)   
Observations 51,603  156,448 156,448 156,448 
Fixed Effects NO  NO Firm & Year 
Firm & Year & 
Analyst 
Clustering NO  NO Analyst & Firm Analyst & Firm 
Adj. R2 0.0001  0.177 0.486 0.488 
The table presents results from pre-post and DiD models on the impact of MiFID II implementation 
earnings forecast errors (Forecast Error). European firms constitute the treated group, and U.S. and Canadian firms 
constitute the control group. The sample includes only sell-side analysts publishing earnings forecasts both before 
and after MiFID II for the same firm (i.e., sample is balanced on analyst-firm). Fixed effects and standard error 
clustering are as indicated in each column. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests and is indicated as follows: *** p-value 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: The Impact of MiFID II on the Number of In-House Analysts Employed by the 
Buy-Side 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 #Buy-Side 
 Pre-Post  Difference-in-Differences 




MiFID II investment 
firm assets group 
Matched on pre-
MiFID II investment 
firm assets group 
TREAT×POST   0.1245* 0.2432*** 0.2185** 
   (1.67) (2.60) (2.34) 
POST 0.1371**  0.0127   
 (2.57)  (0.24)   
Assets Under Management     0.3472*** 
     (3.52) 
Constant 3.8551***  4.4848*** 4.4405*** 3.6554*** 
 (144.77)  (220.16) (189.61) (16.51) 
      
Observations 1,546  5,652 3,092 3,092 
Adjusted R2 0.970  0.954 0.969 0.969 
Fixed Effects Investment Firm  Investment Firm Investment Firm Investment Firm 
Clustering Investment Firm  Investment Firm Investment Firm Investment Firm 
This table reports the results of comparing the number of buy-side analysts in European investment firms before and 
after the implementation of MiFID II, relative to U.S. and Canadian investment firms. The dependent variable is 
#Buy-Side, the number of buy-side analysts. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by investment firms. Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests and is indicated as follows: *** p-
value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
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Table 7: The Impact of MiFID II on Buy-Side Participation in Earnings Conference Calls 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Buy-Side Attendance  Buy-Side Questions  Buy-Side Engagement 
Variables Full Sample PSM Sample  Full Sample PSM Sample  Full Sample PSM Sample 
TREAT×POST 0.023** 0.053**  0.102** 0.243**  2.453** 2.811* 
 (2.32) (2.50)  (2.04) (2.05)  (2.00) (1.86) 
Coverage 0.002 0.003  0.010 0.013  0.062 0.163 
 ( 1.21) ( 1.01)  ( 1.47) ( 0.88)  1) (1.06) 
Size 0.004 0.030  0.052* 0.199  0.534 0.291 
 ( 0.67) ( 1.45)  ( 1.74) ( 1.61)  (1.25) (0.36) 
ROA 0.004 0.096  0.005 0.138  0.555 2.428 
 ( 0.17) ( 0.58)  (0.04) ( 0.23)  0) (0.54) 
Loss 0.004 0.025  0.020 0.072  0.210 0.085 
 ( 0.40) ( 0.74)  ( 0.38) ( .43)  (0.52) (0.09) 
BTM 0.011 0.017  0.027 0.136  0.569 0.923 
 (1.27) ( 0.79)  (0.74) ( 1.25)  5) 59) 
Firm Age 0.026 0.033  0.132 0.133  3.263*** 3.094* 
 ( 1.48) (0.64)  ( 1.39) ( 1.19)  44) 7) 
Leverage 0.016 0.266  0.125 0.907  1.377 4.342 
 (0.46) (1.01)  (0.74) (0.96)  62) 63) 
Tangibility 0.053 0.122  0.380 1.049  4.593 2.309 
 ( 0.81) ( 0.74)  ( 1.36) ( 0.94)  38) (0.33) 
R&D 0.010 0.195  0.099 0.490  6.092* 25.253 
 ( 0.27) ( 0.66)  ( 0.46) ( 0.47)  (1.65) (0.58) 
Financing Activities 0.000 0.009  0.003 0.075  0.097 0.376 
 (0.02) (0.38)  ( 0.05) ( 0.56)  (0.17) 8) 
Stock Return 0.003 0.006  0.011 0.034  0.113 0.417 
 ( 0.30) (0.27)  (0.24) (0.31)  (0.49) 77) 
Earnings Volatility 0.032 0.393  0.082 1.100  7.129 15.921 
 ( 0.49) ( 0.83)  (0.21) ( 0.58)  (1.16) (0.59) 
Return Volatility 0.002 0.012  0.002 0.088  0.679 1.028 
 (0.28) (0.75)  (0.05) (0.82)  (0.49) 0.94) 
GDP Growth 0.009*** 0.017**  0.052*** 0.086**  0.071 1.372** 
 (3.75) (2.45)  (4.05) (2.22)  1) ) 
Log (GDP per Capita) 0.067 0.100  0.203 0.170  7.098 3.880 
 ( 1.03) (0.84)  ( 0.63) (0.28)  57) (0.21) 
Constant 1.315* 1.003  5.389 1.600  144.849 1.248 
 (1.70) ( 0.79)  (1.39) (0.25)  (1.14) 1) 
Observations 25,301 19,078  25,301 19,078  1,589 1,337 
Fixed Effects Firm & Year Firm & Year  Firm & Year Firm & Year  Firm & Year Firm & Year 
Clustering Firm Firm  Firm Firm  Firm Firm 
Adj. R2 0.274 0.322  0.297 0.383  0.365 0.727 
The table presents results from DiD models that test the extent of buy-side analyst participation in earnings-
conference calls. The dependent variable is Buy-Side Attendance in columns (1 2), Buy-Side Questions in columns 
(3 4), and Buy-Side Engagement in columns . The conference call date is matched with the annual firm 
variables using the IBES earnings announcement date (plus or minus one day). All columns include firm and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Statistical significance is based on two-tailed tests and is indicated as follows: 
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1  
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